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ARTICLES
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOREWORD: DETERRENCE OF WAR CRIMES
IN THE 21ST CENTURY
AMBASSADOR DAVID J. SCHEFFER*
In my job as U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, I
meet and work with military personnel around the world. They are on
the front line of my particular war, the war against atrocities. The U.S.
military, for example, has a proud tradition of military justice that has
greatly influenced the development of the laws of war since the Ameri-
can civil war. I draw upon that tradition constantly in my own work.
My intention is to focus on three aspects of deterrence of war
crimes. First, I will address the disturbing phenomenon of the post-Cold
War world, namely the prominence of internal conflicts and assaults on
civilian populations. I want to discuss one example: Sierra Leone, and
our efforts in Washington to create a more effective preventive mecha-
nism to respond to prospective or ongoing atrocities. Second, we need to
recognize the important work of the two existing international criminal
tribunals as instruments of deterrence, and the continuing need to address
the crimes of our own era if we are to sustain a credible policy of deter-
rence. Third, I will examine the new treaty to establish a permanent in-
ternational criminal court and U.S. views about that treaty. This would be
the central institution of deterrence, but we must consider seriously its
content and structure and its impact on military capabilities to confront
atrocities and maintain international peace and security.
We deal daily with the horrific handicraft of genocide, of torturers,
of butchers, or of poorly trained soldiers who commit unjustified vio-
lence against civilians or abuse prisoners of war. Today, 80% of the vic-
tims of armed conflicts are civilians. Tidy theories and international con-
ventions on the laws of war seem to mean very little, if they are aware
of them at all, to the perpetrators of atrocities. Yet, it is our duty in both
the civilian and military chains of command to translate those words into
meaningful and enforceable instruments of law. At stake is not our free-
dom to conduct the just war justly, but the chance to save the lives of
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countless civilians and their means of shelter and livelihood from those
whose pursuit of power knows no bounds.
THE WAR AGAINST CIVILIANS
The challenge of deterring serious violations of international human-
itarian law; genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Ge-
neva Conventions, and violations of the laws and customs of war; in the
21st century first requires that we recognize the problem generated dur-
ing the 20th century, particularly in its final decades. Conventional war-
fare has been transformed in our lifetimes. Armed conflict has become
increasingly identified not with the clash of armies across sovereign bor-
ders, or between "-isms", but with the assault by a government and its
military on its own population, or by a rebel force bent on terrorizing its
own society, or by the use of weapons that have as their aim indiscrimi-
nate mass murder. It is difficult to find an armed conflict anywhere in the
world today where one could describe the regular armed forces of two
countries as waging conventional cross-border warfare between them-
selves and generally observing the laws of war. The norm has become
the internal conflict or self-inflicted atrocity, often with foreign influence
at work to ensure a bloody outcome. Such situations are not easily influ-
enced by the strictures of law, which are little known or understood by
those who control the firepower. The perpetrators of war crimes and
atrocities do not, under such circumstances, bring a keen knowledge of
international humanitarian law to their work. In fact, as I walk through
one massacre site after another in distant reaches of the globe, I have to
ponder whether the laws of war have been of any relevance at all to this
insanity.
I just returned from Sierra Leone, which might serve as the para-
digm for our inquiry into what would deter war crimes in the next cen-
tury. The setting is West Africa, far from the beautiful shores of the Pa-
cific Rim. But what is happening in Sierra Leone should serve as a
warning of the clear and present danger war crimes pose to civilization
in our own time.
While the world's attention has been focused on the massacre last
month of 45 civilians at Racak, Kosovo, and the resulting peace talks in
Rambouillet, France, the atrocities in Sierra Leone are far greater in
number and severity. The magnitude of massacres, mutilations, torture,
rapes, and destruction of civilian property in Sierra Leone is so great that
its full extent is unknown. Eighty percent of eastern Freetown has been
destroyed, and looting and fire have gutted key buildings in central Free-
town. While as many as 5,000 civilians were slaughtered in Freetown in
the last two months alone, that number almost certainly represents a frac-
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tion of the casualties in the two-thirds of Sierra Leone now under rebel
control. We have no idea what atrocities are being committed right now
throughout most of Sierra Leone, except what the stray refugee can re-
late. If past experience holds, the darkness that has swept over Sierra Le-
one over the last year has countless victims whose fate we may never
know.
I visited mutilation victims in Freetown and at several refugee sites
in Guinea. Their stories fit a familiar pattern: The rebels burn down en-
tire neighborhoods, line up men, women, and children and, one-by-one,
chop off their arms and/or feet. Many of the rebels are child soldiers,
typically smoking dope, and weak enough so that the "choppings" often
leave hands dangling from arms, requiring the victim to finish the job on
himself or herself. Victims reported that the rebels said after performing
the mutilations: "Go show this to President Kabbah. Tell Kabbah to help
you now. Kabbah is our enemy." Some boys are spared mutilation, at
least for a while, and abducted to serve as slave labor to the rebels and
as soldiers themselves. Large numbers of young girls and women are
raped and kept in sexual slavery until killed. Some victims told me of
doing everything the rebels told them to, including surrendering all of
their property and performing menial chores for days, only then to be
chopped or, of the unluckiest, killed. I saw one preteen girl whose eyes
had been burned out by rebels pouring heated plastic into them after hav-
ing raped and shot her. She was still extremely traumatized. Another girl
of five or six years old had been thrown into a fire and suffered extreme
burns on the front of her body. Other children were suffering multiple in-
juries from gunshot wounds, burnings, and choppings.
The character of the Sierra Leone conflict is indicative of what
likely confronts the international community in the future: an undis-
ciplined force of child soldiers, led by revenge-seeking rebels and former
government soldiers who exercise no restraint whatsoever in the prosecu-
tion of their campaign for power; of funding derived from control of dia-
mond concessions; of foreign governments collaborating with war
criminals; of the humanitarian crisis wrought by such criminal behavior.
Enforcing the laws of war against such perpetrators, children high on
dope and untrained in civilized military discipline, seems almost surreal;
it certainly will not be easy.
The United States is trying, along with a few other governments, to
seek an end to the hostilities and atrocities in Sierra Leone and to pro-
vide much-needed humanitarian relief to the victims. Efforts are under
way to bring President Kabbah and the rebels together for peace talks.
But the offer for peace talks is only credible if the rebels realize that the
West African peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, is strong enough to prevail
against them. ECOMOG, comprised of mostly Nigerian soldiers, necessa-
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rily has become a peace enforcement operation and it should be fully
supported for the purpose of confronting the rebels and stopping the
atrocities. The United States has committed almost $9 million to support
ECOMOG and is looking for additional federal funds. The United King-
dom has provided significant assistance, and the Dutch have provided
some critical assistance recently. But additional support of all kinds, in-
cluding arms and ammunition, is required. Nigeria, which is considering
pulling out within the next few months, must be persuaded to stay the
course.
I met with ECOMOG Commander Major General Timothy Shelpidi
from Nigeria, and discussed with him the alleged summary executions of
rebels by his soldiers. I recalled the need for military discipline and en-
forcement of the rule of law, which he said would be administered
against any soldiers found to be guilty of crimes. We hope that will in-
deed be the case and that the discipline of ECOMOG, which also has
troops from Guinea, Ghana, and Mali, will conform with the fundamental
requirements of international humanitarian law. But these alleged inci-
dents need to be kept in perspective in comparison with the magnitude of
atrocities committed by the rebels. The consequences of a failure by the
international community to adequately support ECOMOG in this hour of
desperation in Sierra Leone can be catastrophic, not only for the people
of Sierra Leone but also for Guinea and the region as a whole. The Si-
erra Leone conflict can easily spill over into other West African nations
and destroy whatever hope we may have had for regional peacekeeping
efforts.
The role of Liberia, Libya and other African states in supporting the
rebels also requires our continued attention and response. The diamond
trade is attractive to rebel and foreigner alike. Without foreign support,
including mercenaries, the rebels would be a much weaker force. I
stressed to all during my visit to the region that any government that
supports the rebels risks becoming a collaborator in the atrocities.
Our responses to the atrocities in Kosovo and Sierra Leone are tests
of deterring war crimes in the 21st century. In February, I briefed repre-
sentatives of many of the member states of the UN Security Council and
from Africa about the situation in Sierra Leone in New York. The Secur-
ity Council is uniquely positioned to evaluate the threat to international
peace and security, to encourage support for ECOMOG, and to energize
the proposed peace talks. Days earlier, on February 12th, the Security
Council held a formal meeting on "Protection of Civilians in Armed
Conflict," chaired by Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, who
urged the Council to do more to protect civilians in armed conflict.
The U.S. representative, Ambassador Peter Burleigh, confirmed that,
"The United States shares Canada's desire to bring international attention
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to the new character of armed conflict, in which civilians - including hu-
manitarian workers - are often not simply random, incidental victims of
conflict, but its very targets. We must work together," Ambassador Bur-
leigh said, "to find ways to halt this trend. We must strive to strengthen
international protection of civilians, recognizing that the Council's task of
maintaining peace and security can extend to the protection of individu-
als as well." Ambassador Burleigh, on behalf of the United States, wel-
comed the Security Council's reaffirmation in its Presidential statement
on February 12th of "the need for the international community to assist
and protect civilian populations affected by armed conflict; of the need
for all parties concerned to ensure the safety of civilians and to guarantee
the unimpeded and safe access of United Nations and other humanitarian
personnel to those in need; of the obligation of all states to comply
strictly with their obligations under international law; and of the need to
bring to justice individuals who target civilians, as such, in armed con-
flict, or who otherwise commit offenses under international humanitarian
and human rights law. We also support the Council's willingness to re-
spond, in accordance with the UN Charter, to situations in which civil-
ians have been targeted, or humanitarian assistance to civilians has been
deliberately obstructed."
President Clinton announced on December 10th, 1998 the establish-
ment of a formal mechanism in the U.S. Government to facilitate early
warning of atrocities and to consider means to prevent or respond to
them as quickly and effectively as possible. This is a tall challenge, one
that will take time to fully establish, but as head of the inter-agency
group working this project, I am determined to craft a permanent work-
ing system. The Atrocities Prevention InterAgency Working Group, as it
is termed, will be a focal point within the U.S. Government for identify-
ing and coordinating policy responses to atrocities. Our intelligence com-
munity and diplomatic posts will be actively engaged in identifying the
warning signs of atrocities. Information in the public domain every day,
from journalists and non-governmental organizations witnessing what we
often cannot see, will be critical to this effort. We also intend to create a
network of relationships with other governments dedicated to the war
against atrocities, so that we can alert each other as quickly and effec-
tively as possible to unfolding events that may merit collective responses.
We have no illusions as to the degree of difficulty an undertaking of this
character will entail, and the criticism it will inevitably attract when we
have not met everyone's expectations of action. But we have a duty to
try our best to confront atrocities head-on. We hope to hold a conference
in Washington in May where government representatives will be invited
to address these issues.
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WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS
Another test of deterrence is the work of the International Criminal
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. As with the Nu-
remberg and Tokyo international criminal tribunals after World War II, it
is very difficult to judge with precision the real deterrence value of such
courts. Unfortunately, the level of criminal activity since 1945 has sur-
passed the worst nightmares of those who prosecuted the war criminals
of that era. But we know that a central purpose of enforcement of law is
deterrence, and that is as true on the international plane as it is domesti-
cally. We have as much a duty to enforce the rule of law today as our
fathers did at Nuremberg and Tokyo. We too must hope, in this fallible
world, that a signal will be sent to future generations that there will be
consequences for those who wage a war of atrocities.
The work of the Yugoslav and Rwanda war crimes tribunals is be-
ginning to show real progress. Thirty-five indictees of the Yugoslav Tri-
bunal have been taken into custody since 1994. Currently 27 are in cus-
tody in The Hague. Thirty indictees remain at large. Of the original 83
public indictees of the Yugoslav Tribunal, 17 have had charges dismissed
against them and one has been acquitted. Four trials, some with several
defendants, are in progress today; three sets of convictions are on appeal.
The 1999 budget for the Yugoslav Tribunal was increased by 35% to a
total of $103 million. This will permit hiring 206 new staff members and
a new chamber of judges to handle an increasing caseload and investiga-
tive challenge. The apprehension in December of General Radislav Kr-
stic, who led the assault on Srebrenica in 1995, signaled our resolve to
bring to justice the highest level individuals indicted by the Tribunal. An
impressive number of leaders are in custody in The Hague now. Nothing
would serve deterrence better than the swift surrender or apprehension of
those indictees who remain at large. We will not rest until every indicted
individual is brought to the bar of justice in The Hague. It is critical, for
deterrence purposes, that these crimes enjoy no statute of limitations and
no weakening in the resolve of the international community to bring all
indictees into custody. Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, who remain
at large, must understand that they cannot escape judicial accountability
for their alleged actions. Nor can the infamous "Vukovar 3", who enjoy
sanctuary in Serbia along with other indictees.
These are hard tests for international justice, but the United States
calls upon other governments far from the conflict in the Balkans to
stand with us and the Security Council in pressuring Belgrade to comply
with its obligations. We will continue to do everything we can, and
which we have demonstrated we have the capabilities to undertake, to
bring indictees to justice. But we need the sustained support of many
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other governments who also believe in the importance of the Yugoslav
Tribunal's work to join us in this critical endeavor.
The Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal has had remarkable success in
apprehending indictees. A large number of the senior political, military,
and media leaders in Rwanda before and during the genocide of 1994
now sit in the UN Detention Facility in Arusha and are standing or fac-
ing trial. Of 45 publicly indicted suspects, 36 are now in custody. Nine
remain at large. Within the first two weeks of February, 1999, Casimir
Bizimungu, the Health Minister during the 1994 genocide, and Eliezer
Niyitegeka, the Information Minister in 1994, were arrested in Kenya.
Last weekend, Ignace Bagilishema, the former mayor of Mabanza com-
mune in the Kibuye Prefecture and one of the first leaders indicted by
the Rwanda Tribunal in 1995, surrendered himself to Tribunal authorities
in Pretoria. He had been tracked for three years, with arrest warrants is-
sued by the Governments of Zambia, Australia, South Africa, and Singa-
pore. The U.S. Government is working to see that Elizaphan Ntakiru-
timana, an indictee who is in federal custody in Laredo, Texas, will be
transferred to the Rwanda Tribunal in Arusha as soon as possible. The
case is currently before the U.S. Court of Appeals. The 1999 budget for
the Rwanda Tribunal increased by 44% over the 1998 budget, and now
stands at $75 million. 197 new staff positions are being funded with this
increase, as is a new chamber of judges.
The jurisprudence of both tribunals is beginning to establish a strong
body of case law in the enforcement of international humanitarian law.
As instruments of deterrence, the tribunals are formidable partners that
cannot be lightly ignored in the future.
As challenging as the work in the Balkans and Rwanda remains, we
have a collective duty not to forget other arenas of conflict and atrocities
in our own time. The United States has long supported the establishment
by the Security Council of an international criminal tribunal to bring the
senior Khmer Rouge leaders who remain alive to justice for the crimes
of the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia from March 1975 through January
1979. An estimated 1.7 million Cambodians perished during that period
due to the criminal conduct of the Pol Pot regime. In light of recent de-
velopments and a forthcoming report by a group of legal experts ap-
pointed by the UN Secretary-General, we look forward to concrete action
in the Security Council, in cooperation with the Cambodian Government,
to realize this much delayed mechanism of justice.
As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has often said, Iraq's Sad-
dam Hussein is a repeat offender. He and his regime have committed war
crimes on the Iraqi people and on Iraq's neighbors to all points of the
compass. Our policy towards the Iraqi regime is defined in part by our
determination not to let its long history of criminal conduct prevail. We
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believe that the Iraqi regime committed crimes during the invasion and
occupation of Kuwait in 1990-91, including crimes against the Kuwaiti
people, third-country civilians used as human shields, and U.S. and coali-
tion forces. We believe that the Iraqi regime committed crimes during its
campaigns against the Iraqi Kurdish peoples in the late 1980s and early
1990s in northern Iraq. We believe that the Iraqi regime committed, and
continues to commit, crimes against the Iraqi Shi'a peoples in its efforts
to drain the southern marshes, destroying the unique culture of the Marsh
Arabs.
American and British patrols of the no-fly zones began in part to
enforce international humanitarian law. The origins of the no-fly zones
rest in the criminal conduct the Iraqi regime unleashed upon the Kurds in
the north and the Shi'a in the south. By preventing the Iraqi air force
from flying in the two zones, we blunt the Iraqi regime's ability to rep-
ress civilian groups which unquestionably are under threat by the Iraqi
regime. And yet Saddam's propaganda machine would have you believe
that British and American air power is somehow violating Iraqi sover-
eignty. Not only do prior Security Council resolutions support the legality
of the enforcement of the no-fly zones, but we trust that the international
community knows the difference between true enforcement of the law
and the hypocrisy of one of the worst violators of law in our time.
It is telling that at the Rome conference on the establishment of an
international criminal court last summer, the most frequently cited exam-
ples of the need for an effective international court were the need to
prosecute future Pol Pots and Saddam Husseins. Those same govern-
ments and non-governmental organizations need to join us, and others, to
focus just as strongly on the present Saddam Hussein and the living se-
nior Khmer Rouge leaders.
U.S. POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
The United States has had and will continue to have a compelling
interest in the establishment of a permanent international criminal court
(ICC). Such an international court, so long contemplated and so relevant
in a world burdened with mass murderers, can both deter and punish
those who might escape justice in national courts. As head of the U.S.
delegation to the ICC talks since mid-1997, I can confirm that the United
States has had an abiding interest in what kind of court the ICC would
be in order to operate efficiently, effectively and appropriately within a
global system that also requires our constant vigilance to protect interna-
tional peace and security. Our refusal to support the final draft of the
treaty in Rome last summer was grounded in law and in the reality of
our international system.
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On December 8, 1998, we joined consensus in the UN General As-
sembly to adopt a resolution creating the Preparatory Commission on the
ICC which is meeting now in New York under the expert leadership of
Philippe Kirsch, the Legal Adviser of the Canadian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. I recently led the U.S. delegation in the critical work of the
PrepCom to develop the elements of crimes and the rules of evidence
and procedure. The United States has taken the lead in the elements dis-
cussions. This summer the PrepCom will afford an opportunity for con-
cerns we and others have had about the effectiveness and acceptance of
the Court to be addressed. This is an important opportunity to correct the
Treaty. We believe the problems in the treaty which prevent us from
signing it can be solved, and that it is in the interest of all governments
to address those problems now so that we can all be active partners in
the ICC. There is far more to lose in the effectiveness of the ICC if the
United States is not a treaty partner than there is to gain from its current
dubious regime of jurisdiction. As I said at the United Nations in Octo-
ber, we do not pretend to know all the answers. We hope some creative
thinking can be generated in the months ahead.
At the Rome conference last summer, the U.S. delegation worked
with other delegations, many of whose governments are sitting in this
room today, to achieve important objectives. One major objective was a
strong complementarity regime, namely, deferral to national jurisdiction.
A key purpose of the international criminal court should be to promote
observance and enforcement of international humanitarian law by domes-
tic legal systems. Therefore, we were pleased to see the adoption of Arti-
cle 18 (preliminary rulings regarding admissibility), which is drawn origi-
nally from an American proposal, and its companion Articles 17 and 19.
We considered it only logical that, when an investigation of an overall
situation is initiated, relevant and capable national governments be given
an opportunity under reasonable guidelines that respect the authority of
the court to take the lead in investigating their own nationals or others
within their jurisdiction.
Our negotiators struggled, successfully, to preserve appropriate sov-
ereign decision-making in connection with obligations to cooperate with
the court. Some delegates were tempted to require unqualified coopera-
tion by states parties with all court orders, notwithstanding national judi-
cial procedures that would be involved in any event. Such obligations of
unqualified cooperation were unrealistic and would have raised serious
constitutional issues not only in the United States but in many other ju-
risdictions. Part 9 of the statute represents hard-fought battles in this re-
spect. The requirement that the actions of states parties be taken "in ac-
cordance with national procedural law" or similar language is pragmatic
and legally essential for the successful operation of the court.
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The U.S. experience with the Yugoslav Tribunal has shown that
some sensitive information collected by a government could be made
available as lead evidence to the prosecutor, provided that detailed proce-
dures were strictly followed. We applied years of experience with the Yu-
goslav Tribunal to the challenge of similar cooperation with a permanent
court. It was not easy. Some delegations argued that the court should
have the final determination on the release of all national security infor-
mation requested from a government. Our view prevailed in Article 72: a
national government must have the right of final refusal if the request
pertains to its national security. In the case of a government's refusal, the
court may seek a remedy from the Assembly of States Parties or the Se-
curity Council.
The United States helped lead the successful effort to ensure that the
ICC's jurisdiction over crimes against humanity included acts in internal
armed conflicts and acts in the absence of armed conflict. We also ar-
gued successfully that there had to be a reasonably high threshold for
such crimes.
U.S. lawyers insisted that definitions of war crimes be drawn from
customary international law and that they respect the requirements of
military objectives during combat and of requisite intent. We had long
sought a high threshold for the court's jurisdiction over war crimes, since
individual soldiers often commit isolated war criymes that by themselves
should not automatically trigger the massive machinery of the ICC. We
believe the definition arrived at serves our purposes well: "The Court
shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when com-
mitted as a part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commis-
sion of such crimes."
A major achievement of Article 8 of the treaty is its application to
war crimes committed during internal armed conflicts. In order to widen
acceptance of the application of the statute to war crimes committed dur-
ing internal armed conflicts, the United States helped broker language
that excludes situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as ri-
ots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence, and other acts of a similar
nature.
One of the more difficult, but essential, issues to negotiate was the
coverage of crimes against women, in particular either as a crime against
humanity or as a war crime. The U.S. delegation worked hard to include
explicit reference to crimes relating to sexual assault in the text of the
statute. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, en-
forced sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence of significant
magnitude were included as crimes.
As I mentioned earlier, our emphasis on the elements of crimes re-
sulted in Article 9 of the treaty, which requires their preparation; a task
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that governments are now undertaking in New York. We also were in-
strumental in creating acceptable definitions of command responsibility
and the defense of superior orders.
These accomplishments and others in the Rome Treaty are signifi-
cant. But the U.S. delegation was not prepared at any time during the
Rome Conference to accept a treaty text that represented a political com-
promise on fundamental issues of international criminal law and interna-
tional peace and security. We could not negotiate as if certain risks could
be easily dismissed or certain procedures of the permanent court would
be infallible. We could not bargain away unique security requirements or
our need to uphold basic principles of international law even if some of
our closest allies reached their own level of satisfaction with the final
treaty text. The United States made compromises throughout the Rome
process, but we always emphasized that the issue of jurisdiction had to
be resolved satisfactorily or else the entire treaty and the integrity of the
court would be imperiled.
The theory of universal jurisdiction for genocide, crimes against hu-
manity and war crimes seized the imagination of many delegates negoti-
ating the ICC treaty. They appeared to believe that the ICC should be
empowered to do what some national governments have done unilater-
ally, namely, to enact laws that empower their courts to prosecute any in-
dividuals, including non-nationals, who commit one or more of these
crimes. Some governments have enacted such laws, which theoretically,
but rarely in practice, make their courts arenas for international prosecu-
tions. Of course, the catch for any national government seeking to exer-
cise universal jurisdiction is to exercise personal jurisdiction over the
suspect. Without custody, or the prospect of it through an extradition pro-
ceeding, a national court's claim of universal jurisdiction necessarily and
rightly is limited.
The ICC is designed as a treaty-based court with the unique power
to prosecute and sentence individuals, but also to impose obligations of
cooperation upon the contracting states. A fundamental principle of inter-
national treaty law is that only states that are party to a treaty should be
bound by its terms. Yet Article 12 of the ICC treaty reduces the need for
ratification of the treaty by national governments by providing the court
with jurisdiction over the nationals of a non-party state. Under Article
12, the ICC may exercise such jurisdiction over anyone anywhere in the
world, even in the absence of a referral by the Security Council, if either
the state of the territory where the crime was committed of the state of
nationality of the accused consents. Ironically, the treaty exposes non-
parties in ways that parties are not exposed.
Why is the United States so concerned about the status of non-party
states under the ICC treaty? Why not, as many have suggested, simply
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sign and ratify the treaty and thus eliminate the problem of non-party sta-
tus? First, fundamental principles of treaty law still matter and we are
loath to ignore them with respect to any state's obligations vis-a-vis a
treaty regime. While certain conduct is prohibited under customary inter-
national law and might be the object of universal jurisdiction by a na-
tional court, the establishment of, and a state's participation in, an inter-
national criminal court are not derived from custom but, rather, from the
requirements of treaty law.
Second, even if the Clinton Administration were in a position to
sign the treaty, U.S. ratification could take many years and stretch be-
yond the date of entry into force of the treaty. Thus, the United States
could have non-party status under the ICC treaty for a significant period
of time. The crimes within the court's jurisdiction also go beyond those
arguably covered by universal jurisdiction, and court decisions or future
amendments could effectively create "new" and unacceptable crimes.
Moreover, the ability to withdraw from the treaty, should the court de-
velop in unacceptable ways, would be negated as an effective protection.
Equally troubling are the implications of Article 12 for the future
willingness of the United States and other governments to take signifi-
cant risks to intervene in foreign lands in order to save human lives or to
restore international or regional peace and security. The illogical conse-
quence imposed by Article 12, particularly for non-parties to the treaty,
will be to limit severely those lawful, but highly controversial and inher-
ently risky, interventions that the advocates of human rights and world
peace so desperately seek from the United States and other military pow-
ers. There will be significant new legal and political risks in such inter-
ventions, which up to this point have been mostly shielded from politi-
cally motivated charges.
In Rome, the U.S. delegation offered various proposals to break the
back of the jurisdiction problem. The other permanent members of the
Security Council joined us in a compromise formula during the last week
of the Rome conference. One of our proposals was to exempt from the
court's jurisdiction conduct that arises from the official actions of a non-
party state acknowledged as such by that non-party. This would require a
non-party state to acknowledge responsibility for an atrocity in order to
be exempted, an unlikely occurrence for those who usually commit geno-
cide or other serious violations of international humanitarian law. Regret-
tably, our proposed amendments to Article 12 were rejected on the pre-
mise that the proposed take it or leave it draft of the treaty was so fragile
that, if any part were reopened, the conference would fall apart.
The final text of the treaty includes the crime of aggression, albeit
undefined until a Review Conference seven years after entry into force of
the treaty when only the states parties to the treaty at that time determine
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the meaning of aggression. This political concession to the most persis-
tent advocates of a crime of aggression without a consensus definition
and without the linkage to a prior Security Council determination that an
act of aggression has occurred, should concern all of us. The Preparatory
Commission is addressing the issue, however, and we hope it will pro-
ceed responsibly in the years ahead. If handled poorly, this issue alone
could fatally compromise the ICC's future credibility.
I will not belabor the final hours of the conference except to say
that it could have been done differently and the outcome might have
been far more encouraging. While we firmly believe that the true intent
of national governments cannot be that which now appears reflected in a
few key provisions of the Rome treaty, the political will remains within
the Clinton Administration to support a treaty that is fairly and realisti-
cally constituted. We hope developments will unfold in the future so that
the considerable support that the United States could bring to a properly
constituted international criminal court can be realized.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the challenges we all confront to deter war crimes in
the 21st Century have multiplied in recent years, but so too have the in-
struments to confront the epidemic of atrocities that bedevils our genera-
tion of civilian and military leaders. I would like to leave you with the
words of a far wiser diplomat, Under Secretary of State Thomas Picker-
ing, who addressed the cadets at West Point Military Academy on Febru-
ary 1 0th, 1999. Under Secretary Pickering said, "[W]e face serious ques-
tions, particularly when military force is used to intervene in an internal
conflict. Such questions include whether an alliance must wait until its
members' territory is directly attacked or whether it might exercise the
use of force as part of preventive diplomacy. Our Allies' interest in inter-
vening in humanitarian crises is also under review," Under Secretary
Pickering said, "with some seeking a new standard that would call for
the use of force for this purpose. Another potential justification for force
would be against rogue states or near-rogue states that use force first,
such as Iraq against Kuwait or Milosevic inside Serbia against Kosovo
Albanians, in a manner contrary to international legal norms . . . In the
midst of these debates, international engagement may look hopelessly
complex. But this debate is both healthy and necessary. We have entered
a new stage in our history and it is appropriate that we carefully review
national interests, resources, and political will, as well as consider the
ethical and legal bases for our actions."
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